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We propose a heteroscedastic regression model to identify the determinants of the dispersion 
in interest rates on loans granted to small and medium sized enterprises. We interpret 
unexplained deviations as evidence of the banks’ discretionary use of market power in the 
loan rate setting process. “Discretion” in the loan-pricing process is most important, we find, 
if: (i) loans are small and uncollateralized; (ii) firms are small, risky and difficult to monitor; 
(iii) firms’ owners are older, and, (iv) the banking market where the firm operates is large and 
highly concentrated. We also find that the weight of “discretion” in loan rates of small credits 
to opaque firms has decreased somewhat over the last fifteen years, consistent with the 
proliferation of information-technologies in the banking industry. Overall, our results reflect 
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  21.  Introduction 
Technological progress has shaped the evolution of the banking industry over the last few 
decades. In particular, new information and communication technologies assisted banks in 
processing and summarizing information about applicants in credit scores that are used in 
pricing credit. Regardless of the proliferation of credit scoring technologies based solely on 
quantitative information, bankers often rely on their experience and distrust the blind use of 
quantitative information only. Consequently, the final decisions concerning credit approvals 
and loan terms are then based on many different attributes, from which the experience and the 
judgment of the credit staff continue to play a significant role. But how banks then actually 
end up pricing loans to small and medium sized firms remains a largely unanswered question. 
In this paper, we investigate how particular loan, firm, relationship and market 
characteristics affect a bank’s propensity to rely on statistical methods (“rules”) or subjective 
judgments (“discretion”) in the loan rate setting process. We employ a heteroscedastic 
regression model to empirically examine how these relevant characteristics relate to the 
unexplained variance of a linear loan-pricing model. We interpret the higher predictive power 
of the loan-pricing model as evidence of the greater importance of “rules” in the loan rate 
setting process. Larger unexplained variance, on the other hand, is then associated with the 
prevalence of “discretion”. 
The unexplained variance of contracted loan rates essentially reflects heterogeneity in 
lending technologies. Under this view, “rules” and “discretion” represent the extremes of a 
continuum along which lending technologies can be classified according to the relative weight 
of objective and subjective elements in the loan prices. “Rules” is best figuratively described 
by a computer model that receives objective information about applicants as an input; the 
differences in output (i.e., loan rates) then stem exclusively from the quantifiable differences 
among borrowers. In contrast, “discretion” is a pure judgmental technology whereby loan 
rates are entirely set on subjective grounds. These subjective assessments reflect eventually 
market imperfections and the loan officers’ information about the firms’ operating 
environment. Granted, we cannot for certain determine whether the deviations from our loan-
pricing model reflect subjective elements or pricing errors made by loan officers. Although 
some theoretical models support the existence in equilibrium of randomized pricing strategies 
(see e.g. Varian (1980)), subjective pricing is fully consistent with the raison d’être of banks. 
Moreover and more importantly, the deviations are not random, we find, but well explained 
by observable firm, bank, loan contract and banking market characteristics. 
The above distinction between “rules” and “discretion” also clarifies the cogency of our 
methodology. While a computer model treats all applicants equally, conditional on their hard 
information, we can think of the loan officer’s judgment as corresponding to a different 
  3pricing model for each lender. In other words, while “rules” corresponds to a single pricing 
model, “discretion” translates into a multiplicity of different models. As a result, the 
explanatory power of our empirical pricing model decreases with the degree of heterogeneity 
in the original pricing models, i.e. with the relative weight of “discretion”. 
In a frictionless world there should be no room for “discretion”. Loan rates then should 
only vary with verifiable information. However, more reasonable descriptions of the real 
world indicate that the dispersion of loan prices, and hence “discretion”, characterizes the 
equilibrium of credit markets under asymmetric and imperfect information. The extent to 
which loan rates reflect the prevalence of “rules” or “discretion” depends primarily on the 
magnitude of switching costs or information search costs firms face in credit markets. Other 
potential explanations for “discretion” involve imperfectly competitive credit market 
structures and the existence of regulatory constraints such as fixed or capped loan rates.
1 
These market imperfections determine the bargaining power banks have vis-à-vis firms and 
set the boundaries within which banks engage in discretionary loan-pricing practices. Recent 
organization theory has further emphasized the importance of bank structure for the nature 
and success of the lending technology being employed (Berger and Udell (2002) and Stein 
(2002)).
2 
The estimates from our heteroscedastic regression models generate four new robust 
findings.
3 First, banks price larger loans according to more objective criteria or “rules”. This 
finding illustrates that a firm’s incentives to increase its search intensity constrains a bank’s 
ability to price discriminate. Second, several alternative proxies for the borrower risk and 
opaqueness are all unilaterally associated with a larger unexplained dispersion of loan rates. 
This result suggests that the weight of “discretion” is positively related to the switching costs 
firms face. Third, banks seemingly exploit the available public information about their 
borrowers, which we measure by the age of the firm’s owner, for discretionary purposes. In 
contrast, banks seem to avoid price discrimination based on private information. We interpret 
this result as the outcome of a defensive strategy undertaken by banks to shield their 
informational advantage against potential competitors (as in Gan and Riddiough (2006)). 
                                                 
1 See Klemperer (1995) for a review of the literature dealing with switching costs and von Thadden (2004) for 
example for a direct application to bank loan pricing. Stigler (1961) introduced information search costs. Degryse 
and Ongena (2007a) for example review the various sources of bank rents. 
2 This literature suggests that decentralized, small banks have a comparative advantage in small business lending, 
an activity that is often viewed as idiosyncratic and relationship-based. In practice, of course, loan officers may act 
independently of the formal hierarchical structure and have the latitude and incentives towards discretionary loan 
pricing. Bargaining skills of the borrower may then become a key determinant of the contracted loan price. 
Guttentag (2003) for example emphasizes the relevance of these skills for the charged rates in the U.S. mortgage 
market: “If the loan officer tabs you as unknowledgeable and timid, you will probably pay an "overage" -- a price 
above the price listed on the loan officer's price sheet. The lender and the loan officer usually share overages. If 
you are smart and forceful, on the other hand, you might get an underage - a price below the listed price.” 
3 This robustness is largely explained by an important econometric result that states some form of independence 
between the first and second conditional moments in a regression model.  
  4Finally, we find that “discretion” is most important in large and highly concentrated banking 
markets, and in periods of high liquidity. 
We actually employ four different datasets in our analysis: the 1993, 1998 and 2003 
Surveys of Small Business Finances (SSBF), as well as a dataset provided by an important 
Belgian bank. We find no significant disparities in results between the samples, suggesting 
that our results are not sample-specific, time-specific, nor driven by bank heterogeneity. 
However, we do find evidence of a decrease over the last fifteen years of the importance of 
“discretion” in small credits to opaque businesses. This result is consistent with the 
proliferation in the banking industry of credit scoring technologies for small business lending. 
Empirical research on price dispersion is still very limited (see Dahlby and West (1986), 
Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004), and Sorensen (2000)) and this literature typically aims to test 
theories of information differentiation.
4 Our study is the first to empirically analyze the cross-
sectional determinants of discretionary pricing in the market for business loans. While loan 
rate dispersion itself has been widely documented before,
5 no study so far (to the best of our 
knowledge) has identified the actual sources of this dispersion. Our motivation for this 
analysis goes beyond the empirical regularity that loan-pricing models often tend to fit the 
data rather poorly (see e.g. Petersen and Rajan (1994), and Berger and Udell (1995)). What is 
even more striking is the heterogeneity in model fits, a heterogeneity that seems to depend on 
the type of loans and borrowers in the sample that is being investigated.
6  
The credit market is a unique laboratory to study price dispersion, since frictions in the 
credit market are present on both the demand (firm uncertainty about how competitive is a 
loan offer) and the supply side (bank uncertainty about firm quality). Moreover, our variance 
analysis allows us to map the magnitude of the price dispersion on a continuum of lending 
technologies, which differ in the relative weight of subjective inputs or “discretion”. As result, 
our study generalizes the conceptual framework proposed recently by Berger and Udell 
(2006). On the other hand, our analysis is ultimately mute on the hard versus soft information 
dichotomy introduced by Stein (2002). Indeed, we disregard the nature of the information and 
                                                 
4 See for example Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006) for a comprehensive review of this literature. 
5 Heffernan (2002) finds that the margin between the highest and lowest lending rates for U.K. mortgages is 
relatively small (0.45 percentage points), compared with the market for personal loans, where there is a range of 
8.17 percentage points. Hassink and Van Leuvensteijn (2007) find that lending rates in the Dutch mortgage market 
are highly dispersed both across lenders (1 percentage point) and within lenders (0.4 percentage points), even after 
controlling for borrowers’ characteristics and regions. Martín, Saurina and Salas (2005) detect substantial and 
persistent unexplained dispersion of retail loan rates in Spain, across banks and products. Degryse and Ongena 
(2005) analyze data from a large Belgian bank and report substantial variation in loan rates at the branch level. 
6 For example, Degryse and Ongena (2005) estimate the same loan-pricing model for two independent sub-
samples: one with small loans (below $5,000) and another with large loans (above $50,000). The fit of their 
regressions is very different; the R
2‘s are 1% for small loans and 67% for large loans, respectively. 
  5simply concentrate on how well each singular piece of information helps to explain variation 
in the observed loan rates.
7  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical background, 
while Section 3 presents and motivates the methodology. Section 4 discusses the primary 
dataset and Section 5 the results. Section 6 provides the robustness tests. Section 7 tests for 
temporal changes in our results and Section 8 concludes. 
2.  Theoretical Background 
Loan rate dispersion is justified by the existence of market frictions of the sort that the 
economics and financial intermediation literature has extensively analyzed. We choose to 
discuss the theoretical predictions concerning the determinants of loan rate dispersion in three 
separate subsections: information asymmetry, search costs and bank organization. This 
categorization structures the theoretical exposition as well as the subsequent interpretation of 
our empirical results. 
2.1.  Asymmetry of Information 
The severity of information asymmetries in the credit market may determine the nature of 
the lending technology that is being employed. The last decade witnessed an exponential 
increase in the adoption by banks of credit scoring models to evaluate loan applications, 
especially for commercial credits (Akhavein, Frame and White (2005)). However, a score 
may not be totally informative for the bank, especially if it approaches some “gray area”. In 
this case, banks typically complement the score with other types of information (Hand and 
Healey (1997)), increasing their ability ex post to price discriminate with respect to the 
marginal borrowers (Berger, Frame and Miller (2005)). 
The analysis of the Sharpe (1990) model by von Thadden (2004) embeds an explicit 
correspondence between the severity of the information asymmetry in the credit market and 
the dispersion of loan rates. Our simulations of von Thadden’s mixed-strategy equilibrium 
indicate that the von Thadden (2004) model predicts that the variance of loan rates:
8 (i) 
increases non-monotonically in the proportion of “good” firms in the market (the maximum 
variance corresponds to a proportion of about one-half in which case the bank has minimum 
information about the quality of the pool); (ii) increases in the difference in quality between 
                                                 
7 In fact, it is problematic to argue that the residuals of a empirical pricing model provide a good measure of the 
amount of soft information that is being used only, since in general: (i) the true model is unknown; (ii) the model 
omits relevant hard information; and (iii) several variables have a dual role (e.g., is the age of the firm capturing 
hard or soft information?). 
8 We simulate 300 cross-sectional samples of loan contracts from the equilibrium derived in von Thadden (2004), 
by randomizing the following structural parameters of the model: θ (proportion of “good” firms), pH-pL 
(difference in repayment probabilities between the “good” and the “bad” firm), and p (expected repayment 
probability in the credit market when no information about the firms is available). Then, we regress the log of the 
variance in loan rates obtained for each of the samples on the value of these parameters. All results reported are 
statistical significant at the 1% level and the R
2 of the regression is 78.3%. 
  6the “good” and the “bad” firms; and, (iii) decreases in the average probability of loan 
repayment in the credit market.
9 
More general economic analyses can be found in Bester (1988, 1993). The price emerging 
from the bargaining process between buyer and seller in these models is determined by the 
search and switching costs (the buyer’s “outside option”). Bester (1993) shows that ceteris 
paribus buyers with low switching costs face fixed prices, while buyers with high switching 
costs fall into a “haggling equilibrium” with negotiated prices. For a homogeneous product 
bargaining may actually dominate posting prices (Wang (1995)). 
Studies that focus on the possibility of intertemporal risk sharing between firms and 
banks also generate broadly similar predictions. Petersen and Rajan (1995) for example show 
that in concentrated markets banks may optimally subsidize young (and hence opaque) firms 
in their early stages. Later on, banks recoup their losses by charging higher loan rates to the 
older, now locked-in firms. Kim, Kristiansen and Vale (2006) similarly show that interest 
rates, especially for riskier firms, follow a lifecycle pattern. Their prediction implies that loan 
rates for riskier firms exhibit larger unexplained deviations.
10 
Recent work by Gan and Riddiough (2006) demonstrates that banks may for strategic 
reasons avoid engaging in risk-based pricing in order to deter entry from competitors. 
Because the loan price conveys private information about the quality of the borrower, banks 
have an incentive to charge a uniform rate to higher credit-quality firms, and a risk-based rate 
to lower credit-quality firms. Consequently, loan rate dispersion will be an increasing function 
of the firms’ riskiness in their model too. 
To conclude all referred studies predict a positive correlation between firm opaqueness 
and the importance of “discretion” in loan pricing. This correlation stems from the high 
switching costs faced by an opaque firm, which result from the informational advantage a 
lending bank has over its competitors. A bank typically obtains this informational advantage 
over the course of its relationship with the firm, during which the bank learns more about the 
firm’s creditworthiness and prospects (Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992) and Boot and Thakor 
(1994)). Consequently, stronger ties with a firm imply less uncertainty for a lender, and hence 
less “discretion”. On the other hand, this informational advantage also translates into higher 
switching costs, yielding the opposite prediction.  
Naturally, the magnitude of switching costs also depends on the type of firm. Large firms 
for example are generally regarded as more transparent to outsiders. First, typically more 
                                                 
9 Recent theoretical Industrial Organization papers also study the impact of customer recognition in an 
environment of dynamic competition on heterogeneity in product prices. These models show that firms may set 
different prices to qualitatively identical new and old customers. The price difference depends on the market 
structure, the degree of consumer and firm patience, and the firm’s abilities to recognize new from existing 
consumers (see e.g. Villas-Boas (1999) or Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)). 
10 Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Kim, Kristiansen and Vale (2006) provide empirical evidence that supports these 
predictions. Machauer and Weber (1998) analyze how interest rate premia relate to the firms’ credit ratings and 
find a positive, though non-monotone, relation between the level of risk and the dispersion of the charged premia. 
  7information is publicly available on large firms. Second, most large firms have their financial 
records audited, so that this hard financial information provides a more precise and reliable 
indicator of its creditworthiness.
11 Third, large firms are more likely to engage multiple 
creditors, ex ante assuaging potential liquidity and holdup problems (Detragiache, Garella and 
Guiso (2000), von Thadden (1992), Ongena and Smith (2000)). Consequently, banks dealing 
with large clients are constrained to price loans uniformly or based on “rules”. Discretionary 
deviations from such a rule-based equilibrium result in either unprofitable deals (if loan rates 
are set too low) or a higher probability of losing the (potential) client to a competitor (if loan 
rates are set too high). 
2.2. Search Costs 
It is well established in the economics literature that the extent of price dispersion may be 
due to the costly consumer search of information (Stigler (1961), Salop and Stiglitz (1982)). 
The search intensity, in turn, depends on the consumer’s incentives such as the magnitude and 
frequency of the purchase. This intuitive mechanism has straightforward application to the 
credit market. In particular, it implies that both the level and variance of loan rates should 
decrease in the size of the loan. On the one hand, a bank can only expect to grant a loan if the 
loan rate offered is sufficiently competitive vis-à-vis rival banks. On the other hand, banks 
cannot persistently undercut the competitive spread as this may decrease the profitability of 
the loan to an undesirable level. 
  The search mechanism is similar to the presence of switching costs in generating a 
positive correspondence between loan rate dispersion and the magnitude of the underlying 
costs faced by the borrower. The magnitude of either the switching or search costs determines 
the degree of market power the bank has vis-à-vis the borrowers.
12 In turn, market power 
translates into higher dispersion of loan rates, which reflects a larger weight of “discretion” in 
the loan rate setting process. 
2.3. Bank Organization 
Recent organizational theories emphasize the importance of bank organization for the 
loan officers’ incentives to produce soft information, a key component of relationship and 
judgmental lending. In particular, Berger and Udell (2002), and Stein (2002) suggest that 
decentralized, small banks have a comparative advantage in the production of soft 
                                                 
11 Previous studies demonstrate that financial information is only a good predictor of payment performance for 
large firms (see e.g. Eisenbeis (1996)). 
12 The main difference is that search costs may be driven mostly by incentives such as the size of the loan, whereas 
switching costs are mainly a product of firm specific characteristics such as firm size and the stock of private 
information about the firm the bank possesses. 
  8information.
13 This comparative advantage stems from the smaller vertical distance between 
allocation and control in a decentralized bank. Because soft information is costly to acquire 
and difficult to transmit to others, decentralization ameliorates both the incentive problem 
(Stein (2002)) and the agency problem (Berger and Udell (2002); see also Godbillon-Camus 
and Godlewski (2005)).
14 In sum, this line of research suggests that the loan underwriting 
practices of smaller banks employ more discretionary criteria.  
For a given bank, Liberti and Mian (2006) show that the sensitivity of credit approval to 
hard information is larger for credit applications handled at higher hierarchical levels, i.e. 
levels that are more distant from the source of information. In addition, they show that the 
terms of large loans as well as applications from large firms are typically handled at higher 
hierarchical level within the lending bank. This confirms our prior that loan rates of both large 
loans and loans to large firms should exhibit substantially less unexplained dispersion, 
consistent with a lesser incidence of “discretion”. 
3.  Econometric Methodology 
In order to identify the determinants of the dispersion of loan rates, we employ the 
regression model with multiplicative heteroscedasticity proposed by Harvey (1976). The 
heteroscedastic version extends the linear regression model by also parametrizing the 
unexplained variance as function of exogenous covariates. We may think of the 
heteroscedastic regression model as comprising two equations – one to explain the mean of 
loan rates, and the other to explain the residual variance of loan rates. We will refer 
throughout the paper to the mean equation as the loan-pricing model, and concentrate our 
analysis on the variables in the variance equation, which determine the precision of the loan-
pricing model. 
 A conventional formulation of the heteroscedastic model is given by: 
 
  i i i u X y + = β ' ,  (1)
  γ σ '
2
i i Z Log = ,  (2)
 
with the identifying assumptions: 
 
                                                 
13 Consistent with this view, Cole, Goldberg and White (2004) find that the lending decisions of large banks are 
more likely based on financial variables and that the decisions of small banks are more likely a function of the 
strength of the firm-bank relationship. Berger et al. (2005) also test for potential differences in the lending 
technology of small and large banks and find that large banks often lend to large, physically distant firms with 
good accounting records. Degryse, Laeven and Ongena (2007) link the number of visits (by borrowers or loan 
officers) to observed patterns of geographical reach of bank branches and spatial loan pricing. 
14 This implies that large and small banks should differ in their compensation schemes, as well as in their internal 
rules (that define, among other things, the pricing latitude to give loan officers). 
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where   is the dependent variable,   a vector of explanatory variables in the mean 
equation,   a disturbance term,   the residual variance, and   a vector of explanatory 
variables in the variance equation. 
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As a result, we obtain Maximum-Likelihood estimates in the heteroscedastic regression 
model by maximizing the following log-likelihood function with respect to β and γ : 
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An important aspect of this methodology is that the parameters in the mean (β) and 
variance (γ) equations are uncorrelated.
15 While counterintuitive, this corollary will prove 
fundamental in our analysis since it allows us to treat the two equations separately in terms of 
variable selection and interpretation of the results.  
The interpretation of the parameters of interest (γ ) is crucial in our analysis. Pick one 
variable inZ , say  , and its respective parameter,  k Z k γ . A positive  k γ  indicates that the 
precision of the loan-pricing model decreases in  . We interpret this result as evidence of a 




Next, we provide an example that should intuitively substantiate the adequacy of the 
methodology used in this study. Suppose we have detailed information on a sample of loan 
contracts, including observed characteristics of the loan and borrower. We line up (from 
smallest to largest) the existing observations according to one of these characteristics, say the 
loan amount; then, we perform rolling regressions of the loan rate on all available loan and 
                                                 
15 Harvey (1976) provides a technical explanation. The underlying principle – what one could call orthogonality 
between the first and second moments in a conditional distribution – is at the center of several well-known results 
in regression analysis; for instance, this principle explains why the consistency of the coefficients (i.e. the slopes) 
in a linear regression model is not affected by heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation in the error term.  
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parameter estimates and measures of fit relating to the rolling regressions. Our main interest 
lies in the relation between the explanatory power (or its reciprocal, the residual variance) of 
the loan-pricing model and the sorting variable (the loan amount). Figure 1 illustrates the 
outcome of the described method, when applied to our dataset.
16 The graph plots the sequence 
of the residual standard errors obtained in the rolling regressions against the loan amount (the 
sorting variable). Simple visual inspection discloses a negative relation between the 
unexplained variation of loan rates and the size of the loan. This result indicates that the loan-
pricing model (i.e. “rules”) gains predictive power as we move towards windows containing 
larger loans.
17 According to this evidence, we should expect in the variance equation a 
negative sign for the parameter associated with the loan amount variable. 
4.  Sample Description 
The primary dataset used in this study is the 1993 National Survey of Small Business 
Finances (NSSBF), a survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Board and the Small Business 
Administration. The 1993 NSSBF collected data for the fiscal year 1993 for a nationally 
representative sample of 4,637 for profit, non-governmental, non-agricultural businesses with 
fewer than 500 employees. The dataset provides a detailed look at these firms – their 
characteristics and their use of credit and other financial services. We focus, in particular, in 
the firms’ most recent borrowing experiences during the sample period (1990-1994), which 
include data on the characteristics of the borrower and of the lender, as well as the contracted 
loan terms. We restrict our analysis to the sample of 1,695 firms that provided information on 
their most recent loans (about 36% of the total sample). We dropped 31 observations 
pertaining to firms that did not report all the required information and 39 observations related 
to loans granted by non-financial firms. We end up with a final sample of 1,625 
observations.
18 
The NSSBF is ideally suited for our purposes, for several reasons. First, the sample is 
quite heterogeneous with respect to the types of borrowers and loan contracts. Despite its 
focus on small businesses, the sample also contains sizable loans and loans granted to 
reasonably large firms, both of which we presume to exhibit a more transactional nature. The 
coexistence of different types of borrowers and loans ensures a diversity of loan-pricing 
technologies in our sample. While this form of heterogeneity is typically problematic in 
                                                 
16 We delay until the next section the description of our data. 
17 Remember that the results in Degryse and Ongena (2005) (their table VI, p. 256) we reported in footnote 5 were 
similar to this example. 
18 Cole, Goldberg and White (2004) argue that the observations corresponding to loans granted before 1993 – the 
year in which firm specific data is collected – may be potentially endogenous. Unlike them, we do not drop these 
observations (200 in total) since our model estimates a large number of parameters. Our results, however, do not 
change when we drop these observations. 
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this diversity. In particular, we associate unexplained loan rate dispersion to a discretionary or 
judgmental pricing model. For that reason, we choose not to restrict the sample analyzed to 
particular categories of loans (e.g. lines of credit) or borrowers. 
Second, because it has comprehensive information on loan contracts and firm 
characteristics, the NSSBF permits us to exhaustively control for a significant share of the 
variation in loan rates due to “rules”. This point is particularly relevant since we interpret the 
magnitude of unexplained deviations from our loan-pricing model as a measure of the banks’ 
use of “discretion”. 
Finally, data is also available for the subsequently conducted surveys (SSBF 1998 and 
SSBF 2003). Since a consistent definition and a majority of identical questions are used 
across the three surveys, we are able to carry out a temporal analysis of our results over a 
relatively large time span (15 years). 
Table 1 presents the variables used in our study, along with definitions and descriptive 
statistics. We now turn to a detailed description and motivation for each of these variables. 
4.1. Interest Rate Variables 
The dependent variable is the interest rate on the firm’s most recent loan we label as the 
Loan Rate. On the right hand side, we include the variable Prime Rate to control for changes 
in the underlying cost of capital in the economy.
19 Most firms in our sample pay a premium 
on top of the prime rate. However, 71 firms in our sample face loan rates equal to the current 
prime rate, and 91 firms enjoy loan rates below the prime rate. 
4.2. Loan Characteristics 
We employ the dummy variable Floating to control for differences in level between fixed 
and variable interest rates. Ln(Loan Amount) is the log of the amount of the loan in dollars.
20 
The size of the loan provides a tacit measure of the bargaining power the firm has in setting 
loan terms (the loan rate, in particular), since the loan amount is strongly correlated with the 
firm’s incentives to search for potentially better terms (Stigler (1961)). Ln(Loan Maturity) is 
the log of the loan repayment duration and proxies for the term risk. Collateral is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the loan is secured by collateral. Collateral may represent the 
potential risk faced by the lender in the loan contract, as well as signal the quality of the firm 
(Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987)). 
                                                 
19 We obtain the prime rate from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRB of St. Louis). 
20 We used the logarithmic transformation in all continuous variables, except the financial ratios, in order to 
assuage scale problems in our regressions. The logarithmic transformation is particularly convenient in our case 
because we specify an exponential form of heteroscedasticity. 
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The dummies Proprietorship,  Partnership  and  Corporation control for legal and 
governance aspects of the firm. In addition, we employ Corporation (that includes both 
regular and S-type corporations) as a measure of firm size. The size of the firm measures the 
lender’s access to reliable financial information about the firm (Eisenbeis (1996)). Liberti and 
Mian (2006) find evidence that firm size as well as loan size determine the hierarchical level 
within the bank that must approve the terms of the loan. In addition, these variables correlate 
with the size of the bank. As a result, Corporation and Ln(Loan Amount) should also capture 
between, as well as within, differences in banks’ organizational structures (Berger and Udell 
(2002), Stein (2002)). 
Minority indicates whether the firm is owned by members of a minority groups (African-
American, Asian or Native). Our motivation to include Minority follows from the evidence 
that minority groups tend to be more adverse to looking around for the best deals and to 
bargaining (Black, Boehm and DeGennaro (2003)). 
Ln(Owner’s Age) is the log of the age of the firm’s owner in years as of year-end 1993. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that the reputation of the firm’s owner is more important than 
that of the business in predicting loan rates. We correct Ln(Owner’s Age) by the length of the 
firm-bank relationship to avoid spurious correlation between these two variables. Following 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995), we interpret the age of the firm 
(owner) as the amount of public information available about the firm.
21 
4.4. Firm Accounting Information 
If financial statement lending was the dominant transactional technology employed by 
banks in the sample period we analyze (1990-1994), then firms’ accounting figures should 
have a determinant role in explaining loan rates.
22 Ln(Assets) is the log of the book value of 
the firm’s assets. We also include the following accounting identities for the fiscal year 1993, 
deflated by total assets: sales, profits, inventories, accounts receivable, accounts payable, total 
amount of loans and total debt. In addition, we include a variable that captures the firm’s 
reliance on trade credit (Trade Credit Use). Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that trade 
credit usage measures to what extent firms are credit rationed by financial institutions, hence 
affecting a bank’s perception of the quality of the firm. 
                                                 
21 We obtain similar results when we replace the age of the owner by the age of the firm. 
22 Uchida, Udell and Yamori (2007) notice that financial statement lending is a benchmark technology that banks 
may combine with other technologies in their underwriting method. Financial statement lending was probably the 
dominant transactional technology in US in the early 90s, right before the advent of Small Business Credit Scoring 
(SBCS). In fact, the largest provider of external models, Fair Isaac, introduced its first SBCS model in 1995. 
  134.5. Credit History 
Previous studies find that the history of the principal (e.g., Eisenbeis (1996), Berger, 
Frame and Miller (2005)) and third-party mercantile ratings (Kallberg and Udell (2003)) are 
very strong predictors of payment performance of small-business loans. Unfortunately, the 
1993 NSSBF does provide neither such credit-risk measures of the firm nor extensive owner-
specific information.
23 The 1993 NSSBF does include, however, some information regarding 
the credit history of the firm and owner that we use. Bankrupt indicates whether the firm or its 
principal owner has declared bankruptcy within the past seven years; Owner (Firm) 
Delinquent indicates whether the owner (firm) has been 60 or more days delinquent on 
personal (business) obligations within the past 3 years; and Judgments is a dummy that equals 
one if any judgments have been rendered against the principal owner within the past 3 years. 
We further summarize the credit history of the owner and firm in the variable Clean Record. 
Clean Record is a dummy that equals one when all previous variables (Bankrupt, Owner 
Delinquent, Firm Delinquent and Judgments) equal zero. In addition, we include IRS Problem 
– a variable indicating whether the firm reported to have had problems with IRS regulation or 
penalties during the last year. This variable should also provide useful information about the 
credit ratings of the firms. 
4.6. Relationship Characteristics 
Boot (2000) argues that relationship lending, ultimately a judgmental lending technology, 
is a multi-dimensional concept. Accordingly, we control in our pricing-model for three 
dimensions of the nature of the firm-bank relationship. Ln(Duration) is the log of duration in 
years of the relationship the firm has had with the lender. There is ample evidence in the 
literature that the duration of the firm-bank relationship, a common measure of the stock of 
information the bank acquired, affects credit terms (see e.g. Berger and Udell (1995), and 
Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995)). Main Bank indicates whether the lender is the firm’s 
primary source of financial services, capturing the scope of the relationship. Personal is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the firm’s most frequent method of conducting business 
with the lender is in person, or face-to-face. 
4.7. Competition/Location Measures 
The variable Concentrated indicates whether the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in 
the deposits market of the MSA or county where the firm’s headquarters office is located is 
                                                 
23 To test for the potential bias in our results due to the omission of relevant owner and credit-specific information 
we estimate two different specifications of the heteroscedastic model, using the 1998 SSBF. The first specification 
is similar to the one we use in this paper, while the second includes four additional variables (the firm’s credit 
score as obtained from Dun&Bradstreet, the owner’s level of education, the value of the owner’s residence and the 
owner’s net worth sans residence). We find that the two specifications provide almost identical fits and estimates 
for the variance equation. 
  14greater than 1,800.
24 The banking market structure should have both a direct and indirect 
effect on the distribution of loan rates. On the one hand, greater market concentration 
increases the banks’ bargaining power with respect to borrowers. On the other hand, it should 
also influence the nature of the firm-bank relationship (Boot and Thakor (2000)), as well as 
the likelihood that banks engage in intertemporal risk sharing (Petersen and Rajan (1995), 
Kim, Kristiansen and Vale (2006)). 
The variable Ln(Distance) is the log of the distance between the firm’s main office and 
the lending institution’s office. Degryse and Ongena (2005) demonstrate that banks engage in 
spatial price discrimination. Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Berger et al. (2005) document that 
the lender-borrower relation becomes increasingly impersonal as their physical distance 
grows. Personal controls for the alternative transmission channel through which the firm-
bank distance might affect loan rates. Finally, we include the variable MSA, which indicates 
whether the firm is located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
4.8. Other Control Variables 
We additionally include several sets of dummy variables that control for other potential 
sources of information in the loan-pricing model. This information may relate to the purpose 
of the loan (Loan Types), census region (Regions), firm industry (SIC Codes), year of 
approval (Loan Approval Year) and type of lending institution (Lender Type). 
4.9. Variable Selection in the Variance equation 
We need to employ a large number of regressors in the mean equation, disregarding 
potential collinearity problems, for its role is to predict loan rates as accurately as possible. In 
the variance equation, on the other hand, we seek to understand how variables associated to 
particular market imperfections affect the remaining dispersion of loan rates. Although it is 
technically possible to employ the same set of covariates in both equations, the above 
argument should justify per se that we perform variable selection in the variance equation. An 
additional reason for not including many variables in the variance equation is that collinearity 
among regressors and the ensuing decrease in the degrees of freedom might prevent us from 
identifying (in a statistical sense) the principal forces affecting the dispersion of loan rates.  
Next we describe the following variable selection in the variance equation, which is 
rooted in the theoretical discussion in Section 2. The variables Collateral,  Minority, 
Corporation, Clean Record and IRS Problem proxy for the firm’s opacity ex ante. In contrast, 
Ln(Duration) and Ln(Distance) measure how easy it is for the bank to monitor the firm, i.e. 
the firm’s opacity ex post. The theory suggests a positive correlation between firm opaqueness 
and the importance of “discretion”, which results from the informational advantage banks 
                                                 
24 Unfortunately, this is the only measure of banking market concentration available in the 1993 NSSBF. 
  15have over competitors. The equilibrium derived in von Thadden (2004) for example predicts 
that the variance of loan rates is an increasing function of the severity of information 
asymmetries in the credit market, i.e. in the uncertainty pertaining to the quality of the pool of 
borrowers. This informational advantage, which is greater vis-à-vis more opaque firms, may 
enhance a bank’s ability to price discriminate, as well as generate unpredictable lifecycle 
patterns for interest rates (Petersen and Rajan (1995), Kim, Kristiansen and Vale (2006)). 
The loan amount should be a crucial input in the firm’s decision of how much to invest in 
information acquisition, i.e. how much time devoted to “price-shop” (Stigler (1961)). Because 
of this latent increase in competition among potential lenders, larger loans should be priced 
more homogeneously. In addition, we expect the variables Ln(Loan Amount) and Corporation 
to be strongly correlated with bank size. As a result, these variables should capture potential 
differences in organizational structure. Stein (2002) and Berger and Udell (2002) suggest that 
small banks are better at collecting and handling soft information than their larger 
counterparts. Because these soft elements are unobservable and easily manipulated, credit 
decisions by small banks should reflect a greater weight of “discretion”.  
The variables Ln(Owner’s Age) and Ln(Duration) capture, respectively, the amount of 
public and private information available to the bank about the firm. These variables should 
relate to more “discretion” in the loan-pricing process, since added information sharpens a 
bank’s ability to price discriminate. In contrast, banks may strategically conceal their private 
information by setting loan rates merely on basis of publicly observable signals (Gan and 
Riddiough (2006)). 
Finally, the variables MSA and Concentrated control for differences in banking market 
size and structure. One would intuitively expect more “discretion” in more concentrated 
markets (Petersen and Rajan (1995)). In addition, it seems also plausible that larger banking 
markets are characterized by a greater diversity of underwriting procedures and by higher 
search costs (Varian (1980) and McAfee (1983)). As a result, we expect both MSA and 
Concentrated to relate to more loan rate dispersion. 
5.  Empirical Results – NSSBF 1993 
We estimate a heteroscedastic linear regression model to analyze the determinants of the 
dispersion of loan rates. The mean equation specifies a linear pricing model that extracts from 
loan rates that information (or variation) pertaining to “rules”. In the variance equation, we 
identify the factors affecting the residual variance of loan rates, i.e. the “discretion”. 
While our interest lies mainly in the parameters of the variance equation, we also report 
the estimates of the mean equation. Columns I and II of Table 2 report the coefficients of the 
mean and variance equations, respectively. The dependent variable is the interest rate on the 
  16firm’s most recent loan, in basis points (bp).
25 In the mean equation we employ all variables 
described in Table 1 with the exception of Clean Record.
26,27 In the variance equation we 
refine the variable selection as motivated in the previous section. We turn now to the 
discussion of our empirical results. We briefly summarize the results of the mean equation 
and then present, in detail, those pertaining to the variance equation. 
5.1. Mean Equation 
The average firm in our sample obtains an 8.4% loan rate.
28 Consistent with the results in 
Petersen and Rajan (1994 and 1995) we find that loan rates are relatively insensitive to 
changes in the cost of capital for banks. 
Larger loans benefit from lower interest rates. This result probably reflects the borrowers’ 
efforts to get the best possible deals concerning large loans, as well as the dilution of 
contractual and operational fixed costs. Moreover, larger firms obtain more favorable rates. 
This result suggests that banks are able to extract larger rents or that they perceive higher risk 
in smaller, informationally opaque firms. All the effects mentioned are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. 
Consistent with moral hazard theories we find that collateralized loans pay on average 31 
bp more than unsecured loans. The magnitude of this effect lies below the range estimated by 
Brick and Palia (2007), who employed the same dataset and proposed a set of instruments to 
identify the impact of Collateral on loan rates.
29 
Firms with healthier balance sheets and superior track records seem to enjoy lower loan 
rates, although the majority of the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels. Regarding credit history, we emphasize that firms whose owners have 
been delinquent on personal obligations pay a premium of about 78 bp. This finding confirms 
that the history of the owner is a strong predictor of payment performance of small-business 
loans (Eisenbeis (1996)). The estimate obtained for Minority suggests that firms owned by 
minority groups pay a premium of 33 bp. We cannot determine, however, whether this result 
                                                 
25 Our results are virtually unaltered when we use the credit spread, defined as the loan rate minus the prime rate, 
as the dependent variable. 
26 We use the composite variable Clean Record, rather than its components, in the variance equation in order to 
identify an unambiguous effect of a firm’s credit history (our measure of firm credit risk) on the residual variance 
of loan rates, and to conserve degrees of freedom. In the mean equation, though, we employ their respective 
constituents (Bankrupt, Owner Delinquent, Firm Delinquent, and Judgments). 
27 Some of the variables in the mean equation, namely those related to dimensions of the loan contract other than 
the loan rate, raise endogeneity concerns. Our results do not change when we drop these variables (namely 
Ln(Loan Amount), Collateral, Ln(Loan Maturity) and Floating) from the mean equation. 
28 Because we center all explanatory variables, the constants of the model have a direct interpretation – they 
represent the expected loan rate (mean equation) and the residual variance (variance equation) for the average firm 
in our sample. 
29 The omission of relevant covariates can also explain the insignificant effect of Collateral on Loan Rate that 
Brick and Palia (2007) obtain in their OLS regression. Our results are not directly comparable to theirs, because 
Brick and Palia (2007) employ only lines of credit (L/Cs). Nevertheless, we note that our results remain unaltered 
if we restrict our sample to L/Cs. 
  17is due to differences in negotiation skills, differences in the willingness to search for better 
loan terms, or whether it reflects the practice of race-based discrimination.
30 
The remaining estimates are particularly inaccurate. We justify the non-statistical 
significance of many potentially important predictors of loan rates with the inability of our 
model to identify such a large number of parameters with a rather limited sample size.  
The (unadjusted) R
2 of the loan-pricing model is 25%. This value is substantially higher 
than what other studies that employ data from the NSSBF obtain, which is probably due to the 
greater number of explanatory variables we include in our regressions.
31 The distinctive 
aspect in our study is that we recognize the explanatory power of the loan-pricing model to 
depend on certain characteristics of the loan contract, the borrower, and the lender. These 
characteristics reflect the nature of the lending technology adopted by the bank in the 
underwriting process, and hence determine how accurately “rules” predict observed loan 
rates. 
5.2. Variance Equation 
We now explicitly investigate how the fit of the loan-pricing model depends on loan 
contract, borrower, lender and market structure characteristics. Positive coefficients in the 
variance equation indicate larger unexplained deviations (i.e., a poorer fit of the mean 
equation). In turn, large unexplained deviations are consistent with the banks’ adoption of 
loan underwriting procedures that rely more heavily on subjective inputs. In sum, we 
associate large deviations with the predominance of “discretion” in the loan-pricing process 
and small deviations with the prevalence of “rules”. 
The coefficient of Ln(Loan Amount) is negative and highly significant. We provide 
several interpretations for this finding. First, larger loans incite firms to prospect the credit 
market for the best possible deal, as the potential savings in interest payments outweigh the 
costs of searching information and switching lenders. In turn, banks anticipate this latent 
increase in competition by employing more standardized criteria or “rules” in the 
underwriting process of large loans. Second, there is evidence that applications involving 
larger loans are generally appraised by higher hierarchical levels within the lending bank, 
levels that soft information, and hence “discretion” may hardly reach (Liberti and Mian 
(2006)). On the other hand, loan amount may strongly correlate with the size of the lending 
bank, which we do not control for (yet, as we deal with size in robustness tests using another 
                                                 
30 There is evidence that unexplained differences in loan rates between African American- and white male-owned 
firms exist (Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2002)). 
31 For instance, Petersen and Rajan (1994) employ 1,389 observations from the NSSBF 1988 and obtain a R
2 of 
14.5%; Berger and Udell (1995) employ a sample of lines of credit from the same survey and obtain a R
2 of 9.5%. 
It is unreasonable to ’blame’ the poor fits of the empirical loan-pricing models entirely on an insufficient number 
of controls or observations. For instance, Brick and Palia (2007) employ 80 covariates and obtain a R
2 of 11%; 
furthermore, Degryse and Ongena (2005) analyze a sample of 15,044 loans and obtain an R
2 of 22%, even though 
their regression contains 83 covariates. 
  18dataset). Consequently, the negative coefficient of Ln(Loan Amount) may also indicate that 
larger banks rely more heavily on automated and standardized decisions mechanisms 
(Akhavein, Frame and White (2005), Frame, Srinivasan and Woosley (2001)). 
The negative sign of Corporation matches the evidence that smaller firms are intrinsically 
riskier from a bank’s perspective. Either because the information provided by small firms is 
less reliable (Eisenbeis (1996)) or subject to faster depreciation (Chan, Greenbaum and 
Thakor (1986)), banks have incentives to collect proprietary information and afterwards 
arbitrarily capitalize on their informational monopoly.
32 
The coefficients of Minority and IRS Problem are positive while the coefficients of 
Collateral and Clean Record are negative, all being statistically significant. We pool these 
variables in our analysis because they all proxy for the borrower opaqueness.
33, 34 In 
particular, this finding points towards the notion that the dispersion of loan rates increases in 
the risk of the borrower. This result is consistent with the market equilibrium analyzed in von 
Thadden (2004), which predicts a negative relation between the quality of the pool of 
borrowers and the variance of the loan rates. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Kim, Kristiansen 
and Vale (2006)) predict that banks’ incentives to intertemporally cross-subsidize firms 
increase with the severity of informational problems they face. In addition, riskier firms that 
obtained credit probably underwent a more comprehensive screening process, endowing 
banks with more soft information about these firms. These two mechanisms may amplify 
unpredicted deviations from an objective loan-pricing model and hence explain our results. 
Alternatively, the positive relation between firm risk and “discretion” may also reflect a 
bank’s incentive to disguise the true credit quality of high-quality borrowers through pool 
pricing (Gan and Riddiough (2006)). 
The negative estimate obtained for Ln(Duration) indicates a greater prevalence of “rules” 
when there are strong ties between the firm and the lending bank. This seems to contradict the 
conventional wisdom that additional private information about a firm enhances a bank’s 
ability to discretionary shift loan prices.
35 However, the closeness of their relationship also 
determines a lender’s ability to monitor the firm, through the nonborrowing side and the 
personal proximity of their relation, as well as the accuracy and relevance of the information 
that is available.
36 As a result, we interpret this finding in line with our other measures of 
                                                 
32 Off course, corporations tend to prefer large banks, so that the abovementioned arguments pertaining to Ln(Loan 
Amount) apply. 
33 As suggested before, the positive sign of Collateral in the pricing equation indicates that this variable is 
signaling borrower risk, as predicted by moral hazard theories. 
34 See Phelps (1972) for a formal argument with respect to the correlation between credit quality and race. 
35 We added in a separate model the variables Main and Personal to investigate whether the other dimensions of 
the firm-bank relationship had a dissimilar impact on the residual variance. We obtained negative coefficients for 
these two variables and maintained a negative estimate for Duration, reinforcing the rather paradoxical result of a 
negative link between the strength of relationship and the importance of “discretion”. 
36 For instance, Mester, Nakamura and Renault (2006) show that the information provided in checking accounts 
helps the bank to monitor commercial borrowers and to assess sudden changes in credit risks. 
  19borrower opaqueness, i.e. as evidence that the strength of the firm-bank relationship 
ameliorates the bank’s perception of the borrower’s risk.
37 
Age of the firm (or its owner’s) may measure the firm’s public transparency (e.g. Berger 
and Udell (1995), Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995)). We obtain a positive and significant 
coefficient for Ln(Owner’s Age), suggesting that banks are able to discriminate loan prices by 
exploiting public information about borrowers.
38  Given this result, one may pertinently 
question why banks do not seem to employ private information about firms in loan prices as 
well. The model by Gan and Riddiough (2006) offers a possible explanation. Banks have an 
incentive not to disclose private information about their clients in order to keep the 
informational barriers. In contrast, discriminating loan prices based on public information 
should not provide incentives to competitors to enter the market since that information is 
available to all participants. Consequently, an additional explanation for the negative 
coefficient of Ln(Duration) is the bank’s incentive to stick to uniform pricing vis-à-vis their 
long-standing clients to shield its informational advantage vis-à-vis competitors. 
Concerning market structure, we obtain positive estimates for the variables MSA and 
Concentrated. Petersen and Rajan (1995) assert that higher levels of banking market 
concentration provide the necessary incentives for banks to engage in intertemporal risk 
sharing. In addition, the positive sign of MSA indicate that loans rates are more dispersed in 
larger markets (as predicted in Varian (1980), and Carlson and McAfee (1983)). We also find 
that Ln(Distance) is associated with larger unpredicted deviations. Because distance decreases 
a bank’s competence to monitor the firm, this result is consistent with the view that distance 
represents an additional risk factor for the bank.
39 
5.3. Economic Significance of Estimates 
We analyze the economic significance of the coefficients in the variance equation in 
terms of their effects on the R
2 of the mean equation.
40 The constant measures the residual 
                                                 
37 The model in von Thadden (2004) predicts that the variance of loan rates, besides decreasing in the quality of 
the pool of borrowers, it also decreases on the uncertainty concerning the distribution of the borrowers’ quality 
(specified in the model by the spread in success rates between high and low quality firms). Accordingly, our results 
may be simply capturing this link – stronger ties between firm and bank means less uncertainty for the bank (even 
if the firm turns out to be a “lemon”). 
38 If Ln(Owner’s Age) provides a signal (either positive or negative) about the creditworthiness of the firm’s owner 
and if banks use this public information to price loans, “good” firms will get lower rates while “bad” firms will get 
higher rates. Consequently, the unexplained variance increasing in Ln(Owner’s Age) may indicate that banks use 
public information to price loans given to the “good” and “bad” types (that coexist in our sample). Alternatively, 
older managers may face higher search costs, for instance because they are more reluctant or less skillful in using 
modern search technology available on the internet (Brown and Goolsbee (2002)). The positive sign of 
Ln(Owner’s Age) in the mean equation is in line with this view. 
39 The firm-bank distance may also affect the dispersion of loan rates through the nature of their relationship 
(Hauswald and Marquez (2006)). In fact, the coefficient Ln(Distance) nearly halves when we add Main and 
Personal, suggesting that this alternative channel plays a substantial role. 
40 Two assumptions are implicit in this analysis: we compute the changes in R
2 conditional on all covariates and on 
the sample (implying that we treat the total variance of loan rates as exogenous). Under these assumptions, the 
  20variance of the loan-pricing model for the average firm in the sample. Its estimated value 
implies a mean deviation from the predicted loan rate of 77 bp, or a R
2 of 55% in the mean 
equation. Because this R
2 should represent a lower bound of the true importance of “rules” in 
loan rates, this result suggests that “rules” have substantially more weight than “discretion” 
for the average borrower. The coefficient of Ln(Loan Amount) indicates that an increase in the 
loan amount from $25,000 (the 25
th percentile) to $550,000 (the 75
th percentile) induces a 
nearly six-fold increase in the fit of the pricing model. An increase in the distance separating 
the firm from the bank from 1 mile (the 25
th percentile) to 13 miles (the 75
th percentile) more 
than doubles the R
2 of the pricing model; however, going from 1 mile to 304 miles (the 95
th 
percentile) increases the R
2 by a factor of four. The economic effects of the other continuous 
variables,  Ln(Duration) and Ln(Owner’s age), are comparatively modest, ranging in 
magnitude close to the effects of the discrete variables (i.e. with elasticities smaller than one).  
Another insightful exercise is to assess the dispersion of loan rates for different types of 
borrowers. For instance, consider an unsecured loan of $25,000 granted to a single business 
(firm A).
41 Firm A’s track record contains recent business delinquencies and it has conducted 
business with the lender for three years. Suppose there exists also a corporation (firm B) that 
is granted a $550,000 secured loan. In contrast to firm A, firm B enjoys a clean legal record 
and it has had a relationship with the lender for 13 years. According to our estimates, the 
expected loan rates for firms A and B are 9.3% and 8.1%, respectively. In addition our 
estimates translate into R
2s of the estimated pricing model of 1% for firm A and 81% for firm 
B. The residual deviations implied by these R
2s indicate that, with 95% confidence, firm A 
could face any loan rate in the range from 5.1% to 13.5%, whereas the range for firm B is 
substantially narrower: 6.3% to 9.9%. In short, these results illustrate the contrast between the 
intense use of “discretion” by the bank in the loan pricing process (firm A) and a standardized 
loan-pricing model (firm B). 
6.  Robustness Tests 
6.1. Analysis of Extreme Residuals 
Because we focus on the unexplained loan rate spreads paid by the firms, a pertinent 
question is to what extent the estimated firm-specific variances may reflect asymmetric, or 
one-sided, deviations. In particular, we seek to identify the factors associated with large 
upward and downward deviations from the “rules”. For this purpose we propose to analyze 
separately positive and negative residuals. Our empirical strategy is as follows. We estimate a 
                                                                                                                                            
interpretation of the coefficients in the variance equation is straightforward: for a continuous (discrete) variable, it 
denotes the relative change in the R
2 resulting from a relative (discrete) change in the corresponding variable. 
41 In the subsequent analysis we set the continuous variables to their 25
th or 75
th percentiles, as explicitly 
mentioned or implied in the text. The omitted variables take the value of zero. 
  21quantile regression of Loan Rate on the set of explanatory variables used in the loan-pricing 
model.
42 Then, importing the classic terminology from Salop and Stiglitz (1977), we generate 
the dummy variables Rip-off / Bargain, which indicate whether the estimated disturbance is 
larger / smaller than one standard deviation above / below the sample mean of the residuals.
43 
Finally, we estimate logit regressions of the variables Rip-off and Bargain on the same set of 
variables we employ in the variance analysis (see Column II in Table 2). 
Table 3 displays the results. Consistent with our previous findings, Ln(Loan Amount) and 
Corporation decrease the probability of observing large deviations, in particular the 
probability of a rip-off. In contrast, the variables Minority, IRS Problem and Ln(Distance) 
increase the probability of both a bargain and a rip-off. Minority has a stronger effect on a 
downwards deviation, which is consistent with a bank’s willingness to subsidize opaque firms 
(Petersen and Rajan (1995)). Conversely, banks are substantially more likely to add a mark-
up to a firm that has a fiscal delinquency in its track record. We are unable to draw 
conclusions on the remaining results, as they are particularly noisy and mixed. 
6.2. Relevance of the Information in the Loan Granting Process 
We admittedly saturated our loan-pricing model with a great number of covariates, raising 
the concern that some of that information may be irrelevant from the bank’s perspective. We 
cannot directly test this assertion, for the true pricing model is unknown to us. Nevertheless, 
we propose to test this assertion indirectly. If the information contained in our variables is 
relevant for pricing purposes, then it should predict relatively well the banks’ decisions of 
granting or denying credit to applicants. We estimate the probability of a firm being granted a 
loan as function of the set of variables employed in the loan-pricing model. In other words, 
we replicate a multivariate logistic credit-scoring model.
44 Studies focusing on scoring 
methods suggest that financial institutions extensively use multivariate logistic models to 
estimate default probabilities (Altman and Saunders (1998), Hand and Henley (1997)). Using 
the 50% probability as the cut-off decision point, our model predicts correctly 88% of the 
observed outcomes, clearly reflecting the relevance of the information used. We believe our 
results are potentially strengthened if banks use more conservative cut-offs in the 
acceptance/rejection decision.
45 
                                                 
42 The quantile (or median) regression has the advantage over the linear (or mean) regression model that, while not 
affecting the residual variance, it is robust to skewness in the distribution of the residuals. For instance, if positive 
deviations from the true pricing model are more sizeable than the negative ones, then a mean regression model will 
underestimate positive deviations and overestimate the negative ones. 
43 The sample mean of residuals of the quantile regression is positive (about 17 bp), suggesting that banks are more 
likely to shift loan rates upwards than downwards.  
44 Naturally, we drop all variables related to loan characteristics. The loan amount is replaced by the amount 
requested. The total number of observations is 1,916, distributed into 1,625 accepted loans and 291 credit denials. 
45 As suggested before, banks may reduce risk by bringing other types of information into the credit approval 
decision, especially when the applicants’ scores are in the “grey area” (Hand and Henley (1997)). 
  226.3. Sample Selection 
The analysis we made so far disregards the fact that banks may use the same subjective 
elements in both the approval/rejection and the loan pricing decisions. We question how our 
results change when we take into account this sample selection bias. For this purpose, we 
combine the heteroscedastic regression model with a heteroscedastic probit model (the 
selection equation). Because we include the same variables in both variance equations, we 
allow for two sources of correlation between the two error terms: the variables in the variance 
equation and a parameter ( ρ ) measuring the degree of sample selection bias.
46 Our results 
indicate the absence of selection bias as  ρ  is negligible (both economically and statistically). 
We also find that our variables in the variance equation have very low explanatory power in 
the credit approval model, suggesting that “discretion” mainly occurs through loan-pricing. 
6.4. Specification of the Pricing Model 
We question to what extent the linearity assumption in our loan-pricing model may be 
biasing our results. As a robustness test, we estimate the pricing model and obtain the fitted 
values, i.e. the predicted loan rates; then, we re-estimate the model including in the mean 
equation the quadratic and cubic terms of the fitted values.
47 If the potential non-linearities in 
the model are biasing our results, then the introduction of these extra terms should 
significantly alter the estimates in the variance equation. The estimates obtained (not 
tabulated) indicate that is not the case. Despite the non-linear terms being statistically 
significant in the mean equation, the results in the variance equation are virtually unaffected.
48 
6.5. Discontinuities in “Rules” versus “Discretion” 
The application of “discretion” itself may be inherently discontinuous. For example, 
various loan and firm types may be assigned to different loan officers operating under unique 
pricing rules (see Liberti and Mian (2006)). To test for the presence of such discontinuities we 
decompose each continuous variable into a linear spline with two breaks.
49 We then estimate a 
heteroscedastic regression using the splines instead of the original variables in the variance 
equation. 
                                                 
46 In particular, the covariance between the two equations is given by 0 exp( 0.5 ' ) Z ρ γγ − + , where ρ  is the 
correlation coefficient between the two equations measuring the degree of sample selection bias, and where  0 γ  is 
the constant term in the variance equation. 
47 In spirit similar to the Ramsey (1969)’s Specification (or Reset) Test. 
48 We also estimate the model employing linear splines (at ten equally spaced knots) in the mean equation in place 
of the original (continuous) variables. Apart from a substantial increase in the coefficient of Ln(Owner’s Age), the 
results in the variance equation remain virtually unaltered. 
49 Each continuous variable is mapped into the following three mutually exclusive categories: small (if the value of 
the variable is in the lowest tercile), large (if the value is in the largest tercile) and medium (for intermediate 
values). Our results are qualitatively similar when we impose four breaks (yielding five distinct categories) instead 
of two. 
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particular, we obtain a sharp negative effect for small loans (below $47,000), a moderate 
negative effect for large loans (above $325,000), and surprisingly no effect for medium-sized 
loans (between $47,000 and $325,000). We conjecture that the strong negative effect for 
small loans reflects search efforts by firms. The break occurring at mid-sized loans followed 
by the negative effect for large loans may capture either a discontinuity at the hierarchical 
level within the lending banks or a discontinuity across banks of different sizes. 
Our previous findings suggest that “discretion” decreases over the duration of the 
relationship between the firm and the bank. We confirm this result for short (less than 3 years) 
and long (more than 10 years) durations, but we find the opposite effect for medium lengths 
(between 3 and 10 years).
50 Concerning Ln(Distance), our results indicate that the positive 
effect of this variable on “discretion” is constant but confined to firms located further than 
two miles from the lender. That is, Ln(Distance) does not affect “discretion” when the firm is 
within a two mile radius of the bank. Finally, we find no discontinuities regarding the age of 
the owner. 
6.6. Bank Heterogeneity 
A major drawback of using the NSSBF 1993 dataset is that it comprises several 
unidentified banks. This is problematic as banks can differentiate themselves along service 
dimensions and operating costs. Fortunately, we have access to an alternative dataset that 
allows us to control for bank heterogeneity. This dataset, which has been used in Degryse and 
Van Cayseele (2000), and Degryse and Ongena (2005, 2007b), consists of a large number of 
loans made by one important Belgian bank.
51 Despite being less comprehensive than the 
NSSBF in terms of firm-specific information, we find several attractive features in the 
Belgian dataset. First, and most of all, it allows us to include branch fixed-effects in our 
regressions to control for branch heterogeneity within the single lending bank. Second, it 
permits us to test the sensitivity of our results with respect to the NSSBF sample design. In 
particular, the potential differences in financial, geographical and cultural landscapes between 
the U.S. and Belgium provide a serious challenge to the scope of our results. 
 We estimate a heteroscedastic regression model using all the information available in the 
Belgian dataset that we employed previously in the regressions with the NSSBF sample (i.e., 
the variables described in Table 1). Due to data limitations in the Belgian sample, we are only 
able to explain the variance as function of the variables Ln(Loan Amount),  Collateral, 
                                                 
50 By allowing a greater number of intervals in the spline we actually see that the initial break occurs for 
relationships lasting between one and one-and-a-half years. In the medium term the loan officer may have 
achieved her maximum informational advantage. Internal mandated rotation and outside banks’ observing the 
repeated lender – borrower interactions might ultimately weaken this informational advantage. 
51 We refer to these studies for a detailed description of the dataset. 
  24Corporation, Ln(Duration),  Concentrated and Ln(Distance).
52 Aside from Collateral, the 
results (not tabulated) confirm our previous findings, as the estimates are nearly identical in 
terms of sign and statistical significance to those we obtain with the NSSBF sample (see 
Table 2, Column II).
53 Besides highlighting that bank heterogeneity is not driving our earlier 
results, this robustness check demonstrates that their scope goes beyond the specificity of the 
sample analyzed. 
6.7. Industry Heterogeneity 
Banks may adopt different loan pricing strategies or “rules” for different industries. We 
run a heteroscedastic regression for each of four broadly defined industry groups: construction 
(SIC1 – division C, 186 observations), manufacturing (SIC2 and SIC3: 274 observations), 
trade (SIC5: 502 observations) and services (SIC6, SIC7 and SIC8: 571 observations).
54 The 
pooled sample results largely carry through to these industry-specific regressions, though the 
new estimates display larger standard errors. We report, however, the following discrepancies 
in the variance equation, which are likely related to composition differences across these 
samples. First, Ln(Amount) seems not to be a determinant of “discretion” in the 
manufacturing sector.
55 Second, Concentrated has a negative sign and is statistically 
significant in the construction and trade sectors. 
7.  Has “Discretion” Varied Over Time? 
We now seek to detect temporal changes in the banks’ loan-pricing behavior. In 
particular, we investigate whether the weight of “discretion”, reflected in the greater 
unexplained dispersion of loan rates, has changed over time.  
The literature fails to propose a clear-cut prediction regarding how the importance of 
“rules” and “discretion” may have evolved over the last two decades. It is widely recognized 
that the exponential increase in information processing capabilities has provided banks with 
innovative and low-cost tools to support their credit decisions. Less obvious is that the 
effective influence of these technologies in the banks’ credit decisions has increased over 
time. For instance, Berger, Frame and Miller (2005) argue that the new technologies may act 
as a substitute for or complement to existing lending technologies. Accordingly, one could 
                                                 
52 Unfortunately, the Belgian dataset does not provide credit history information on the firm, accounting 
information, information about the owner nor does it specify the financial services the bank provides to the firm. 
As a result, we cannot include in the variance equation the variables Minority, Ln(Owner’s Age), Clean Record, 
IRS Problem and MSA. In addition, in the Belgian sample Ln(Distance) is the shortest traveling time to the lender 
(in minutes). 
53 The coefficient of Collateral is positive and highly significant. Because we lack proxies for firm risk in the 
variance equation (such as the legal record), it may well be that Collateral is standing for credit risk. 
54 Our sample contains only 17 observations from the primary sector (agriculture and mining) and 75 observations 
from utilities (SIC4), hence we disregard these sectors in our analysis. To conserve degrees of freedom we 
estimate the heteroscedastic model with the same set of variables in the mean and variance equations (i.e., those 
variables we previously selected for the variance equation, as described in Section 4.9). 
55 The median loan amount in the manufacturing sector is about four times the total sample average. 
  25expect an increasing or a decreasing role over time for “discretion”.
56 In our subsequent 
empirical analysis, we seek to identify which of these effects dominates. Specifically, we test 
in a panel sample for the existence of a trend in the unexplained variation of loan rates. 
7.1. Panel Sample 
We construct a fully rotating panel by merging the 1993 NSSBF (1,625 observations, 
from 1990 to 1994), the 1998 SSBF (708 observations, from 1996 to 2000) and the 2003 
SSBF (1,568 observations, from 2001 to 2005). The resulting panel sample spans 16 years, 
from 1990 to 2005. A consistent definition and a majority of identical questions used across 
all three surveys permits an analysis of changes over time.
57 Table 4 reports sample statistics 
for each of the three samples. We opt to provide independent statistics for each sample as the 
unfolded panel allows us to assess major changes in the sample compositions across surveys, 
as well as spot temporal correlations. 
We start by analyzing the differences between the 1998 SSBF and the other samples.
58 
This period is characterized by a severe contraction in credit supply, reflected in the higher 
cost of capital and smaller loans, when compared to the 1993 NSSBF and 2003 SSBF. There 
is also an unusual higher incidence of transactional lending, signaled by the low percentage of 
L/Cs (nearly half of that observed in the other samples), the low fraction of loans granted by 
commercial banks (not tabulated), and the atypical values displayed by the relationship 
variables (shorter durations, higher incidence of impersonal relations and lower incidence of 
cross-selling). In addition, borrowing firms in the 1998 SSBF are on average smaller, more 
profitable, leveraged and riskier. Concerning market structure, firms in the 1998 SSBF 
operate in more concentrated markets and in rural areas, and borrow largely from distantly 
located lenders. 
By comparing the 1993 NSSBF to the 2003 SSBF we identify three clear trends in the 
data, irrespective of the referred fluctuations in the cost of capital surrounding 1998. First, 
there is an increase in loan maturity. Second, there is a steep decrease in the incidence of 
loans secured by collateral. Finally, the dispersion of loan rates has increased over time, 
which is not to say that “discretion” has increased over time. In the next section we formally 
test for the presence of such a trend in the data. 
                                                 
56 One could also argue that the proliferation of the internet led to a decrease in search costs, and hence of 
“discretion”. However, this may have not been the case initially (mid- to late-nineties). First, internet banking is a 
rather recent phenomenon, and second, there is evidence that internet in early times actually led to an increase in 
price dispersion (Brown and Goolsbee (2002)). 
57 IRS Problem is the only variable not present in the three surveys. 
58 The 1998 sample has a rather odd composition, when compared to the 1993 and 2003 surveys, probably due to 
the global financial crisis surrounding 1998. Our results are virtually unaffected when we remove the 1998 survey 
from our panel sample. 
  267.2. Results 
Table 5 displays the results from estimating a heteroscedastic regression model with the 
panel sample. We just present the variance equation estimates to conserve on space. Column I 
employs a specification identical to the one we used to derive our cross-sectional results (see 
Column II, Table 2).
59 The panel results, apart from the drop in both magnitude and 
significance of Clean Record and Ln(Duration), confirm our previous findings with the 1993 
NSSBF. We note, however, a substantial increase in the overall explanatory power of the 
model, as the R
2 of the variance-weighted linear regression (i.e. the loan-pricing model 
weighted by the estimated variances) leaps from 28% to 50%. This increase in explanatory 
power seems to be a product of the increase in the number of observations.
60 
In Column II we add the temporal dimension to our analysis by including in the variance 
equation the variables Prime Rate and Year. Prime Rate controls for fluctuations in banks’ 
risk shifting incentives. Consistent with the view in Rajan (2006), the negative coefficient for 
Prime Rate indicates that banks tend to take more risks in periods of high liquidity (i.e. low 
interest rates). The variable Year captures a time trend in the residual variance. We obtain a 
positive and statistically significant trend, which we interpret as tentative evidence of an 
increase over time in the weight of “discretion”.  
Despite suggestive, these results may simply reflect structural changes in market 
conditions occurring during the period analyzed. We have in mind, in particular, the growing 
evidence that banks were increasingly lending to riskier (Berger, Frame and Miller (2005)), 
more distantly located firms, and on a more transactional basis (Petersen and Rajan (2002)). 
Our cross-sectional results (see Column II in Table 2) and the predictions in von Thadden 
(2004) imply that these referred changes could explain per se a positive trend in the 
unexplained variance.  
To account for potential changes in market conditions we interact every variable in the 
variance equation with Year. Column III displays the results. The previous estimates in the 
variance equation are virtually unaffected by the inclusion of the interaction terms, which 
simply add a dynamic dimension to our cross-sectional results. For instance, it seems that the 
positive effect of Clean Record and Concentrated on the residual variance (i.e. “discretion”) 
has increased over time. In contrast, loans secured by collateral were during this period 
increasingly priced according to “rules”. Consistent with the concerns expressed in Rajan 
(2006), our estimates also suggest that banks’ risk shifting incentives have intensified over 
time. 
                                                 
59 We employ in the mean equation the same variables we used in our cross-sectional analysis (see Table 1) plus a 
full set of year dummies (16) to control for aggregate fluctuations. 
60 We test this assertion by estimating separately a regression model for each sample. We do not observe 
significant differences in explanatory power in the three samples. This result leads us to conclude that the increase 
in the number of observations is probably driving the increase in explanatory power of the loan-pricing model. 
  27Because we center all covariates, the variable Year captures a time trend in the residual 
variance for the sample average firm.
61 Its negative coefficient suggests a declining role for 
“discretion” over the sample period for the average firm, though the effect is not statistically 
significant.
62 But the interaction terms reveal an interesting asymmetry this result masks. In 
particular, it seems that the negative time trend is more pronounced for small firms with 
weaker credit histories that obtain small loans, and nearly inexistent for large firms borrowing 
large amounts. In particular, we obtain a statistically and economically significant decrease 
over time of the weight of “discretion” for a small firm that borrows $10,000 from a new 
lender, consistent with the proliferation of credit scoring models for micro-loans (Berger, 
Frame and Miller (2005)) and the findings in Brevoort (2006) and DeYoung, Frame, 
Glennon, McMillen and Nigro (2007). In contrast, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
role of “discretion” in underwriting decisions concerning large loans and loans granted to 
large, transparent firms has remained steady over the last fifteen years.
63 
8.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a heteroscedastic linear regression model to analyze the 
unexplained dispersion of loan rates. Our variance analysis allows us to infer about the nature 
of the lending technology that banks employ in the loan granting process. Larger unexplained 
deviations from the loan-pricing model are consistent with banks engaging in discretionary 
loan-pricing (a judgmental technology). On the other hand, we interpret smaller deviations as 
the predominance of “rules” (a fully transparent lending technology). By parametrizing the 
unexplained variance of the loan-pricing model, we are able to identify the factors associated 
with “rules” and “discretion”. We believe this study is unique in that it combines within the 
same empirical framework a wide array of theoretical developments in the financial 
economics literature on the role of informational frictions on market performance. 
Consistent with theories based on costly search of information, we find that the weight of 
“discretion” in loan prices decreases in the size of the loan. In contrast, loan rate dispersion 
increase in various measures of the borrower opaqueness, in particular firm size, credit history 
and the bank’s effort to monitor the firm. We interpret this result as evidence that the 
switching costs faced by firms are an important source of market power for the lending bank. 
                                                 
61 Computing the marginal effect of Year for a median firm yields a similar result. 
62 The 2003 SSBF contains a substantial number of renewals of lines of credit. Renewal decisions may rely more 
on old information than decisions on new applications, introducing additional noise in our static loan-pricing 
model. Indeed, we obtain a sharper negative trend for “discretion” when we drop these renewals. The other results 
are virtually unaffected. 
63 These temporal results may be partially masked by structural changes in the legal environment in the U.S. 
banking industry, i.e., the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, that occurred during our sample period. We include an 
indicator variable for loans granted after 1999 in the variance equation (of the model in Column III). This inclusion 
reinforces our previous results as the negative trend for “discretion” becomes steeper. Interestingly, we find that 
the residual variance is 57% larger for loans granted after 1999, this effect being statistically significant at the 1% 
level. 
 
  28Our results also reveal that the weight of “discretion” increases with the age of the firm 
owner, as well as with the size and level of concentration in the banking market. 
We perform several robustness tests regarding the specification of the loan-pricing model, 
and compared our primary results (NSSBF 1993) with those obtained in a dataset pertaining 
to a large Belgian bank. We found minor disparities, suggesting that our results are not 
sample-specific, time-specific, or driven by differences in banks’ technological and 
organizational structures. Finally, we construct a panel sample with the 1993, 1998 and 2003 
(N)SSBF and show that the significance of “discretion” decreased over the period analyzed 
(1990-2005) for small loans to opaque firms. Changes in market conditions rooted in the 
development of information and communication technologies seem to explain the decrease in 
loan rate dispersion during this period. 
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 Moving-Window Regressions 
 
This figure plots the root mean squared error (RMSE) of the moving-window regressions against the log 
of the loan amount. First, we line up the observations by the loan amount (from smallest to largest), and 
then perform moving-window regressions of the loan rate on the set of variables described in table 1, 
using a fixed window size of 500 observations. The figure plots the sequence of RMSEs obtained in the 
regressions against the log of the loan amount. The dataset used is the 1993 NSSBF. 
 Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics, 1993 NSSBF 
 
The table defines the variables employed in the empirical specifications and provides some sample statistics: mean, median (Med), standard deviation (S.d.), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max). The statistics do not 
take into account the 1993 NSSBF sample weights. The number of observations is 1,625. Other variables used in our regressions (dummies): type of loan (5), 2-digit SIC codes (9), year of loan (4), census regions (8) 
and type of lender (8). We do not present descriptive statistics for these variables to conserve on space. 
Variable              Description Mean Med. S.d. Min Max
Interest Rate Variables 
Prime Rate  Prime rate (%)  6.5  6  0.72  6  10 
Loan Characteristics 
Loan Rate   Loan rate (%) [Dependent Variable]  8.4  8  2.1  0  32 
Loan Amount  Loan size ($million)         
          
         
       
1.1 0.1  0.00 4.7 100
Loan Maturity  Loan maturity (years)  3.3  1  4.4  0.08  30 
Collateral  =1 if loan is collateralized  0.72  1    0  1 
Floating  =1 if floating loan rate  0.59  1    0  1 
Firm Characteristics 
Organization Type
Proprietorship  =1 if firm is a proprietorship  0.18  0    0  1 
Partnership  =1 if firm is a partnership  0.07  0    0  1 
S-Corporation  =1 if firm is a S-corporation  0.29  0    0  1 
Regular Corporation  =1 if firm is a regular corporation  0.46  0    0  1 
Owner  Characteristics
Owner’s Age  Age of firm’s primary owner at start of relation with lender  42  41  11  2  81 
Minority  =1 if firm is owned by minority race  0.09  0    0  1 
Firm Accounting Information 
Assets Total  assets ($million) 33  7  96  0.008  2,400
Sales  = sales / assets  4.4  2.7  6.9  0  92 
Profits  =profits / assets  0.41  0.1  2.3  -31  43 
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Table 1 (cont.) 
 
Variable Description Mean Med. S.d. Min Max
Inventories  = inventories / assets  0.18  0.1  0.23  0  1 
Accounts Receivable  = accounts receivable / assets  0.22         
       
        
        
        
        
        
0.16 0.22 0 1.1
Accounts Payable  = accounts payable / assets  0.15  0.09 0.2 0 3.5
Total Loans  = total loans / assets  0.46  0.33  0.75  0  20 
Leverage  = total liabilities / assets  0.7  0.58  0.89  0.00  21 
Trade Credit Use   % of purchases on trade credit  62  80  41  0  100 
Firm Credit History 
Bankrupt  =1 if firm declared bankruptcy in past 7 years  0.02 0 0 1
Owner Delinquent 
=1 if owner has been 60 or more days delinquent on personal 
obligations within past 3 years 
0.07 0 0 1
Firm Delinquent 
=1 if firm has been 60 or more days delinquent on business 
obligations within past 3 years 
0.17 0 0 1
Judgments 
=1 if any judgments have been rendered against the principal 
owner within the past 3 years 
0.04 0 0 1
Clean Record 
=1 if owner has clean record (the four previous variables equal 
zero) 
0.78 1 0 1
IRS Problem  =1 if firm had IRS problems or penalties in the past year  0.34  0    0  1 
Relationship Characteristics 
Duration  Duration of relationship with the lender (years)  7.9  5  7.7  0  53 
Main Bank  =1 if loan granted by primary bank  0.73  1    0  1 
Personal  =1 if firm mainly conducts business with lender in person  0.65  1    0  1 
Competition/Location Measures 
Concentrated  =1 if HHI>1800 (firm's headquarters office)  0.5  1    0  1 
MSA  =1 if firm located in MSA  0.77  1    0  1 
Distance  Distance to lender (miles)  53  3  213  0  2,608 
  
Table 2 
Results of Heteroscedastic Regression with 1993 NSSBF  
 
The table lists the coefficients and standard errors (S.e.) for the mean equation (Column I) and variance equation (Column II) from a 
heteroscedastic regression with Loan Rate (in basis points) as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables in both the mean 
and variance equation, which we describe in Table 1, are demeaned. We obtain the estimates by Maximum Likelihood. The symbols 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Some measures of fit are provided. χ
2 (k) is the statistic for 
the joint test that all coefficients except the intercept are zero, for k degrees of freedom. Pseudo-R
2 is defined as 1-Likelihood(just a 
constant)/Likelihood (full model). The VWLS (variance-weighted least squares) R
2 is obtained by using the inverse of the estimated 
variances in the heteroscedastic model as weights in the corresponding linear regression model. 
 
I – Mean Equation  II – Variance Equation 
Variable 
β  S.e.  γ  S.e. 
Constant 842.2
***  4.2 10.10 
***  0.04 
Interest Rate Variables 
    
   
Prime Rate  50.8
***  7.0  
   
Loan characteristics 
    
   
Ln(Loan Amount)  -10.1
***  3.4 -0.27 
***  0.02 
Ln (Loan Maturity)  0.2
  4.4  
   
Collateral 31.4
***  9.2 -0.18 
**  0.08 
Floating Rate  -33.6
***  8.8  
   
Firm characteristics 
    
   
Corporation 
   -0.24 
***  0.09 
Owner characteristics 
    
   
Ln(Owner's Age)  8.6
  9.6 0.39 
***  0.13 
Minority 32.6
*  17.1 0.34 
***  0.13 
Accounting information 
    
   
Ln(Assets) -14.2
***  3.7  
   
Sales   -1.3
*  0.8  
   
Profits 2.0
  2.1  
   
Inventories  -25.6
  19.0  
   
Accounts Receivable  -13.3
  19.5  
   
Accounts Payable  15.3
  29.2  
   
Total Loans   -4.6
  17.4  
   
Total Debt   16.3
  16.2  
   
Trade Credit Use (%)  -0.1
  0.1  
   
Credit history 
    
   
Bankrupt -2.6
  30.7  
   
Owner Delinquent  77.2
***  20.3  
   
Firm Delinquent  15.1
  11.6  
   
Judgments 24.4
  23.0  
   
  37 
 
Table 2 (cont.) 
I – Mean Equation  II – Variance Equation 
Variable 
β  S.e.  γ  S.e. 
Clean Record 
   -0.25 
***  0.09 
IRS Problem  7.7
  7.8 0.16 
**  0.07 
Relationship characteristics 
    
   
Ln(Duration) -2.4
  5.2 -0.12 
**  0.05 
Main Bank  15.7
  10.1  
   
Personal 5.5
  8.5  
   
Competition/Location 
    
   
Concentrated 5.9
  7.8 0.10 
  0.08 
MSA 4.7
  9.6 0.18 
**  0.09 
Ln(Distance) 3.2
  2.8 0.10 
***  0.02 
Other Controls 
    
   
Loan Type (5)  Yes
**    
   
Firm Organization Type (3)  Yes
**    
   
SIC Codes (9)  Yes
    
   
Loan Approval Year (4)  Yes
**    
   
Regions (8)  Yes
**    
   
Lender Type (8)  Yes
***    
   
Number of observations   1,625 
Number of parameters   74 
χ
2-Statistic  980.4 
Pseudo-R
2 (%)  4.46 
VWLS R
2 (%)  28.26 
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Table 3 
Analysis of Extreme Residuals 
 
The table lists the marginal effects (in %) from fitting a logit model to estimate the probabilities of observing a large positive residual (Rip-
off) and a large negative residual (Bargain). The residuals originate from a quantile regression of Loan Rate on the set of variables presented 
in Table 1. Rip-offs (Bargains) correspond to residuals one standard deviation above (below) the sample mean. Bootstrapped standard errors 
(1000 replications) are provided. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The dataset used is 
the 1993 NSSBF. 
 
Prob. of Rip-off  Prob. of Bargain 
Variable 
Mfx (%)  S.e.  Mfx (%)  S.e. 
Loan Characteristics          
Ln(Loan Amount)  -2.2
***  0.3 -1.4
***  0.3 
Collateral  -0.7 1.4  0.3
  1.3 
 
Firm Characteristics    
   
Corporation  -2.2 1.6  -1.3
  1.5 
 
Owner Characteristics    
   
Minority  2.3 2.4  3.4
  2.3 
Ln(Owner's Age)  -0.5 2.1  0.8
  2.4 
 
Credit History    
   
Clean Record  1.0 1.4  0.0
  1.4 
IRS Problem  3.0
**  1.4 1.6
  1.3 
 
Relationship Characteristics    
   
Strength of Relationship  0.4 0.8  -1.6
**  0.8 
 
Competition/Location Measures    
   
Concentrated  -1.4 1.3  -1.0
  1.2 
MSA  0.0 1.6  -1.4
  1.7 
Ln(Distance)  0.9
**  0.4 1.1
***  0.3 
Number of Observations  1,625  1,625 
Pseudo-R
2 (%)  7.3  7.1 
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Descriptive Statistics – (N)SSBF 1993, 1998 and 2003 
 
The table provides some sample statistics (mean, median and standard deviation) for the 1993 NSSBF, 1998 SSBF and 2003 SSBF. The 
number of observations is 1625 for the 1993 NSSBF, 708 for the 1998 SSBF and 1568 for the 2003 SSBF. We remit to Table 1 the definition 
of the variables. 
 
Mean Median  Standard  Deviation 
Variable 
1993 1998 2003  1993 1998 2003 1993 1998 2003 
Interest Rate Variables                   
Prime  Rate  6.52 8.22 4.39  6  8.25 4.22 0.72 0.33 0.74 
Loan  Characteristics            
Loan Rate  8.4  9  5.7  8  9  5.5  2.1  2.2  2.5 
Ln(Loan  Amount)  12 11 12  12 11 12  2.1  1.9  1.9 
Ln(Loan Maturity)  0.6  1  1.2  0  1.1  0.95  1  1.2  0.72 
Collateral 0.72  0.65  0.56  1  1  1       
Floating Rate  0.59  0.33  0.55  1  0  1       
Loan  Type            
Line of credit  0.6  0.3  0.62  1  0  1       
Capital lease  0.02  0.06  0.01  0  0  0       
Mortgage 0.09  0.12  0.10  0  0  0       
Vehicle loan  0.08  0.18  0.11  0  0  0       
Equipment loan  0.09  0.19  0.10  0  0  0       
Other 0.12  0.15  0.06  0  0  0       
Firm  Characteristics            
Organization Type            
Proprietorship 0.17  0.26  0.16  0  0  0       
Partnership 0.07  0.07  0.07  0  0  0       
S-Corporation 0.29  0.34  0.45  0  0  0       
Corporation 0.46  0.34  0.32  0  0  0       
Owner Characteristics            
Ln(Owner's Age)  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.8  3.8  0.3  0.31  0.36 
Minority 0.09  0.10  0.06  0  0  0       
Accounting Information            
Ln(Assets)  13 13 14  13 13 14  2.1  2.2  2.1 
Sales 4.6  78  5.3  2.7  2.8  2.8  9.5  1,880  15 
Profits  0.35  68  0.66 0.10 0.16 0.12  3  1,766 4.6 
Inventories  0.18  0.16 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.23 0.23 0.22 
Accounts  Receivable  0.22  0.20 0.23 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.22 0.24 0.25 
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Table 4 (cont.) 
 
Mean Median  Standard  Deviation 
Variable 
1993  1998 2003 1993 1998 2003 1993 1998 2003 
Accounts  Payable  0.15  0.32 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.20 2.96 0.29 
Total  loans  0.46  1.4  0.79 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.75  13  3.8 
Leverage 0.7  1.8  1  0.58  0.68  0.60  0.89  14  3.9 
Trade Credit Use (%)  62  61  63  80  80  80  41  41  40 
Credit history            
Bankrupt 0.02  0.01  0.01  0  0  0       
Owner Delinquent  0.07  0.10  0.06  0  0  0       
Firm Delinquent  0.17  0.20  0.19  0  0  0       
Judgments 0.04  0.02  0.02  0  0  0       
Clean Record  0.78  0.76  0.77  1  1  1       
Relationship 
Characteristics            
Ln(Duration)  1.9 1.4 2 1.8 1.4  2.1  0.84  0.92  0.87 
Main Bank  0.73  0.57  0.74  1  1  1       
Personal 0.65  0.55  0.61  1  1  1       
Competition/Location            
Concentrated 0.50  0.53  0.47  1  1  0       
MSA 0.77  0.74  0.77  1  1  1       
Ln(Distance)  1.9 2.4 2 1.4 1.8  1.6  1.6 2.1  1.6 
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Results of Heteroscedastic Regression with Panel Sample 
 
The table lists the coefficients (Coeff.) and standard errors (S.e.) for the variance equation from a heteroscedastic regression of Loan 
Rate on the set of variables described in Table 1. We obtain the panel sample by merging the 1993, 1998 and 2003 (N)SSBF samples. 
Year is the year in which the loan was granted. We remit to Table 1 the description of the remaining variables. We obtain the estimates 
by Maximum Likelihood. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. We provide some 
measures of fit. Pseudo-R
2 is defined as 1-Likelihood(just a constant)/Likelihood (full model). The VWLS (variance-weighted least 
squares) R
2 is obtained by using the inverse of the estimated variances in the heteroscedastic model as weights in the corresponding 
regression model. 
 
Panel Sample (I)  Panel Sample (II)  Panel Sample (III) 
Variable 
Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. 
Constant 10.45
***  0.02 10.42
***  0.02 10.4








Ln(Loan Amount)  -0.20
***  0.01 -0.23
***  0.01 -0.22
***  0.01 
Collateral -0.39
***  0.05 -0.27
***  0.05 -0.30









**  0.06 -0.13
**  0.06 -0.14
**  0.06 
Minority 0.45
***  0.08 0.46
***  0.08 0.41
***  0.09 
Ln(Owner's Age)  0.15
*  0.08 0.10
  0.08 0.12
  0.08 
Clean Record  -0.05
  0.05 -0.09
  0.05 -0.07









  0.03 -0.05
  0.03 -0.06
**  0.03 
Competition/Location  
   
   
   
Concentrated 0.15
***  0.05 0.14
***  0.05 0.12
**  0.05 
MSA 0.23
***  0.06 0.22
***  0.06 0.24
***  0.06 
Ln(Distance) 0.15
***  0.01 0.14
***  0.01 0.13
***  0.01 





Prime Rate        -0.06
***  0.02 -0.03
  0.02 
Year (Time Trend)       0.04
***  0.01 -0.08
  0.08 
Interaction Terms             
 
 
Year × Ln(Loan Amount)              0.01
***  0.00 
Year × Collateral              -0.03
**  0.01 
Year × Corporation              0.01
  0.01 
Year × Minority              0.02
  0.02 
Year × Ln(Owner's Age)              0.00
  0.02 
Year × Clean Record              0.06
***  0.01 
Year × Ln(Duration)              0.01
  0.01 
Year × Concentrated              0.02
**  0.01 
Year × MSA              0.03
**  0.01 
Year × Ln(Distance)              0.01
*  0.00 
Year × Prime Rate              -0.01
**  0.01 
Number of observations (N)  3,901  3,901  3,901 
Number of parameters  85  87  98 
Pseudo-R2 (%)  5.4  5.6  5.7 
VWLS-R2 (%)  49.8  48.6  46.7 
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